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ABSTRACT 
The paper uses a  demand for seigniorage revenue  and  supply of 
seignorage  revenue  approach to determine the consequences 0  cots in 
public spending for the rate of nrlaton.  Monetar, nsncing is iesed 
as the residual financing mode, with tax rates and pubic debt—GDP 
ratios held constant.  In a small oper economy with an  evogennus real 
interest rate, cuts n  public consumption spending will lower the 
inflation rate n  the revenue—efficient region of the seigcio.  age caffer 
curve.  When there are cuts in public sector capital formafior 
,  tTe 
inflation rate ran rise even in the seigniorage—efficient region. This 
sill be the case i  the expenditure effect  which reduces the deficit 
one-for-one) is more than of1set by direct and indirect revenue effects 
(which raise the deficit' and by  an adverse money demand effect. 
When the real  interest rate is endogenous, the scope for 
inflation—increasing  poolic spending cuts is enhanced. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper studies the consequences for inflation of public expenditure 
cuts.  The  setting  is  that  of  a  small  open  economy,  but  most  of  the 
analysis  is  applicable  to  closed  economic  systems  as  well.  While  the 
emphasis  is  on  the  long  run,  transitional  dynamics  will  be  considered 
briefly. 
While  the purpose  of this paper  is to develop a  general  theoretical 
franework, the question it addresses was motivated by the recent experience 
of the Mexican  economy  (see Feltenstein and Morris  (1987),  Jarque  (1987) 
and Jung (1987)). 
With but minor abuse of language we can pose  the question  that is the 
title of this paper in terms of the demand for and  supply of seigniorage 
revenue.  Monetary  financing  is viewed  as the residual  financing mode  of 
the government.  Specifically, real per capita public spending, current and 
capital, are treated as exogenous as are real per capita lump sum taxes and 
the proportional  tax rate on domestic value added.  Real per  capita stocks 
of public  debt, internal  and external, are also  taken as given.  Cuts  in 
public spending will therefore affect the demand for seigniorage revenue by 
changing  the  (inflation—and—real—growth—corrected)  public  sector  deficit 
that  must be  financed  by  printing  money.1  The  paper  emphasises  the 
potentially  important distinction, as regards their  effect on the public 
sector  deficit, of cuts  in public  sector consumption  and  cuts  in public 
sector capital formation. 
Real  seigrliorage  revenue  (the  real  value  of  new  issues  of  nominal 
high—powered or base money) can be written as the product of a "seigniorage —2— 
tax  rate"  (the proportional  rate of  change  of  the high  powered  nominal 
money  stock,  /L)  and  the  "seigniorage tax base"  (the real  stock  of money 
balances or the real stock of money balances per capita, m). 
Across  steady  states there  is a  one—for—one  association  between  the 
seigniorage  tax  rate  and  the  rate of  inflation;  in classical  flex—price 
models,  such  a  relationship  may  exist  also  in  the  short  run,  say  for 
unanticipated,  immediate and permanent changes in .  The  seigniorage  tax 
is indeed often referred  to as  the  inflation tax and we will  follow this 
rather sioppy usage. 
Given the seigrtiorage  tax base, there will be a unique seigniorage tax 
rate  that  generates  ("supplies)  the  required  seigniorage  revenue. 
However, because the velocity of circulation of high—powered money  is not 
independent of the  (expected) inflation rate,  the seigniorage tax base  is 
likely to vary  (negatively) with the seigniorage tax rate,  at any rate in 
the  long  run.  This  leads  to  the  possibility  of  a  seigniorage Laffer 
curve":  the  elasticity  of  the  seigniorage  tax base  with  respect  to the 
seigniorage tax rate can become  greater than unity in absolute  value,2  so 
higher growth rates of the nominal money stock (and sooner or later higher 
actual  and expected  inflation) will  appropriate a  smaller amount  of real 
resources for the government. 
If  there  is perfect  international capital mobility  and  the  long—run 
real interest rate is independent of the government's spending behaviour, a 
cut  in public  consumption spending reduces the long—run rate  of inflation 
as long as,  if there are multiple rates of inflation yielding the same real 
seigniorage  revenue,  the  authorities  always  choose  the  lower  rate  of 
inflation,  i.e.  as long  as the  equilibrium  is on the  (globally) revenue 
efficient segment of the seigniorage Laffer curve. —3— 
When  cuts  in  public  sector  capital  formation  are  considered,  the 
expenditure effect, which cet.par. reduces the budget deficit one—for—one, 
lowers inflation  (and is the only effect in the case of public consumption 
cuts) is supplemented by three further effects.  The direct revenue effect 
represents  any  cash  returns  the  government  may  receive  as  a  direct 
consequence of its ownership of  the  public sector capital stock (including 
infrastructure).  The indirect revenue effect measures the implications of 
a  lower public  sector capital stock for  domestic production and  thus for 
production or income—related taxes.  The money demand effect is the effect 
of a lower  public  sector capital  stock on money demand  (at a  given real 
interest rate and inflation rate) through its effect on  the  scale variable 
(some measure of income or wealth) in the money demand function.  While the 
direct revenue  effect  is ambiguous,  the  indirect  revenue  effect and  the 
money  demand  affect  will  mitigate  and may even  reverse  completely  the 
inflation  reducing  expenditure  effect  of  cuts  in  public  sector  capital 
formation. 
When  there  is  limited  international  capital  mobility  (the  paper 
considers  the  zero capital mobility  case)  the real  interest  rate becomes 
endogenous.  The response of the real interest rate to public spending cuts 
when money is the residual financing instrument is ambiguous, however.  It 
is quite  possible  that  the  real  interest  rate  would  rise,  even  in  the 
long—run. 
Note  that  the  paper  studies  the  effect  of  spending  cuts  on  the 
inflation  rate,  not  on  the  level  of  the  path  of  money  prices.  The 
possibility of a negative association between the volume of public spending 
and the general price level has been  discussed by Hall (1987) and will only 
be reviewed here  in brief.  Let M be the nominal stock of high—powered or 
base money, V the income velocity of circulation of high—powered  money, P —4— 
the general price level and Y  real income.  The identity of exchange states 
that 
MV  PY 
Let  M be  given  at  a  point  in  time;  through policy  choice  in a  closed 
economy;  in an open economy through a freely floating exchange  rate or,  if 
the  exchange  rate  is  managed,  through  capital  or  exchange  controls. 
Velocity  is  generally  taken  to  be  a  non—decreasing  function  of  the 
opportunity  cost of holding  outside money,  which  is  the nominal  interest 
rate,  i,  when  the  monetary  base  does not  earn  any  interest.3  In many 
niacromodels (but not  necessarily in the  one considered  in this paper)  ,  a 
public spending cut has a non—positive effect on the  real interest rate,  r. 
Consider  the case where  r actually  falls.  Holding constant  inflationary 
expectations  (an assumption that is not in general consistent with rational 
expectation formation), i falls and velocity falls u:h  it.  Nominal income 
therefore  declines.  If  real  income  stays  constant  or  rises,  the price 
level  falls  unambiguously.  Only  if  real  income  falls  by  more 
(proportionally) than the decline in velocity, will the price level rise. 
A necessary  condition for  such an association is a positive  effect or 
real output of an increase in public spending.  In a Keynesian model with 
demand—constrained  output  and  employment,  real  output  of  course  does 
decline  in response to a cut  in public spending,4 but  the price level is 
either taken to be predetermined or assumed to decline with output along a 
public spending—invariant upward—sloping aggregate supply schedule. 
There are a  whole range of possible direct and indirect, short—run and 
long—run  effects of public  spending on equilibrium output.  These  include 
direct  substitutability  or  complementary  between  current public  spending 
and current private spending  (see Buiter  (1977))  or between current public —5— 
spending  and  the  supply  of  labour.  There  also  can  be  short—run  real 
interest  rate effects on the  supply of labour  (through  the intertemporal 
substitution  mechanism  emphasised by Hall  (1987)) and  on  the  demand  for 
labour (through working capital channels as in Blinder (1987)).  This paper 
does not  consider  these effects but  does  allow for  a  long—run effect  of 
public spending on the private capital stock. 
The  organisation of  the  paper  is as follows.  Section 2 develops  the 
model.  In Section  (2a)  we consider the public sector and its "demand for 
seigniorage'.  Section  (2b)  models  production  and  factor  demand  with 
special emphasis on the role of public sector capital.  Private consumption 
and portfolio behaviour  (including money  demand) are  developed in Section 
(2c).  Market  equilibrium and  the external  accounts  are given  in Section 
(2d).  Section  3  contains  a  brief  discussion  of  seigniorage  and  the 
exchange  rate  regime.  In Section 4 we  consider  the longrun  effects of 
public  spending cuts on the rate of inflation while  Section 5  contains  a 
brief discussion of dynamic issues.  Section 6 concludes. —6— 
2.  The Model 
2a.  The Public Sector 
Equation  (1)  gives  the  budget  identity  of  the  consolidated  public 
sector, i.e. general government, state enterprises and central bank 
M  — E*  +  +  +  —  T — J +  + i  (BR)  (1) 
M is the nominal stock of high—powered money, base money or reserve money 
It consists of coin and currency held by the public and  reserves held b: 
the commercial banking system.  It bears a zero nominal interest rate. 
is the stock of domestic—currency—denominated interest—bearing public debt 
It has a fixed nominal market value and a variable nominal interest rate 
and is only held  domestically.  B*  is  foreign—currency—denominated  publi 
debt.  It bears a nominal interest rate i  and is only held abroad.  R*  ic 
the stock of official foreign exchange reserves, which are assumed to bea: 
the  same interest  rate,  i*,  as foreign currency  denominated public  debt 
CG  is  public  consumption  spending,  I gross  public  sector  capita 
formation, T taxes net  of transfers and J government cash  income from tb 
public sector capital stock KG.  CG,  1G,  T,  J and KG are  all measured  i 
terms of  domestic  output.  E  is  the nominal  spot  exchange  rate,  P  th 
domestic  CDP  deflator  and  P-k  the  foreign  GDP  deflator.  Ignorin, 
depreciation,  gross  <and net)  public sector capital formation I  and  th 
public sector capital stock KG are related by 
The government's direct gross  return from the  stock of public  secto 
capital  <including  social  overhead  capital),  J,  is  the  product  of  th 
capital stock KG and its  gross cash rate of return G, i.e. —7— 
J 
F*G  R*—B* is the governments  net stock of foreign assets.  We define the 
following ratios to the labour force (or  to the population) L. 
M  c  KG  B  *G  EF*G  —  ER*  G  EB*G  m—:k E_;b_;f  ____;R*—_;b* —;  FL  L  L  FL  FL  PL 
c  1G  T  c  1  r 
Let  r  P/F  be the domestic rate of GD? inflation,  ,r*  P*/P*  the foreign 
rate of GDP inflation, e  E/E the proportional rate of depreciation of the 
nominal  exchange  rate  and n  L/L  the  proportional  growth  rate  of  the 
labour force and population.  F  EP*/P is the real exchange rate  (defined 
here  as  the  ratio  of  the  foreign  GDP  deflator  times  the  nominal  spot 
exchange rate to the domestic GD? deflator) or the reciprocal of the terms 
of trade  y is the proportional rate of depreciation of the real exchange 
rate,  le. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper  the  distinction  between  domestically 
produced goods and foreign goods and  the  endogeneity of the real exchange 
rate  are not  important.  Using Occam's  razor, we  therefore  restrict  the 
analysis that follows Section 2a to a one good world, i.e.  y  0. 
The  real  interest  rate  on  (domestically  held)  domestic—currency— 
denominated public debt  r and the real  interest rate on foreign—currency— 
denominated debt r* are defined by 
r  i—r —8— 
The government's budget identity (1) can now be rewritten as: 
The  real value  of high  powered nominal money  stock  issues per  worker  or 
real  seigniorage per  capita, a,  can be written  in three  equivalent  ways 
given in equations (2a,b,c).  i  M/M is the proportional rate of growth of 
the nominal high—powered money stock; 
M 
(2a) 
a  th+(n+)m  (2b) 
rzm  (2c) 
I shall refer to a as "seigniorage" or the "inflation tax", although usage 
is not yet standardised here.5 
Let  d denote  the real per  capita net  non—monetary liabilities  of  the 
government. 
d  b_f*GkG 
The budget identity can  be rewritten more completely as: 
a  cG_r÷(r_n)+Q_a 
where —9— 
Equivalently,  letting  ci  denote  the  net  real  per  cap:ta  financial 
non—monetary liabilities of the government, we have 
d  E b_f*G 
cG+iC_r_pCkG+(r_n)d+(r_(r*+))f*G_ 
Total tax receipts are a linear function of GDP, i.e. 
T = OY+t0,  OO<1 
In what follows the proportional tax rate 0 is interpreted as  vae  adden 
tax. 
The  governments  present  value  budget  constraint,  r  sslvn' 
constraint is given in (7) or (7') 
-(r(u)-n)du 
f  e  [r(s)_ct(s)_Q(s)]ds +  e  (s)ds 
-(r(u)-n)du 
-J(r(u)-n)du 
+  5 t 
a(s)ds ) d(t) 
Equations (7)  and (7') are derived from equations  (3)  and 5  respectnij 
by imposing the "no Ponzi game' transversality conditions —i(r(o -n)du 
ha e  d(v)CO and Ha  e  d(v)CO respectively. 
v—ia,  v-4 
2b.  Production 
Domestic  output  is  produced  by  N  identical  comretitive  firms  The 
production  function of the ith firm is  given by 
Ti  Ki,  i(KG,N),Li)  (8) 
Ti  Mi  and  L are output,  caoital  input  and  labour  input of  the  ith  firm 
respectively.  KG  is  the  aggregate  social  overhead  capitol  stock  vboso 
services are available  free of charge  to private  firms.  Ti  is increasing 
and  linear  homogeneous  in  M,  I  and  L4,  strictly  concave,  twice 
continuously differentiable and  satisfies the made conditions  for Mi and 
Li.  I  is  increasing  in  KG,  non—increasing  in N  and  twice  continuously 
differentiable. 
Gne simple special case of (8) is given in equar.ion  (9) 
Ti = F(Ki,Ka,L), i.e.  r(yGtfl  vG  (9) 
In this version there  is  no  "congestion effect"  involved  in  the  impact  of 
the  pohlic  sector  stock  on  the  output  of  firm  i.  The effect of  K on  the 
output. of the ith firm is independent of N,  the number of firma.  P-yen  with 
free  entry.  there  will  in  general  be  positive  pure  profits  KGyG>G,  In 
this  case  we  con  model  aggrsgats  output  as  if  it  were  produced  :-.-  o. 
representative firm as  in, 
=  F(K,K,L).  (9') —11-- 
Letting  y  Y/L, k  K/L and  kG  KG/L  equation  (9')  implies,  through 
constant returns, equation (10) 
y  f(k,kG)  (10) 
Each individual firm takes KG as given and optimally chooses K  and L  to 
maximise after tax profits given the real wage w and the real interest rate 
r.  We therefore have  the following first order conditions for competitive 
factor demands: 
(l_O)f1(k,kG)  r  (11) 
(l_o)[f(k,kG)_kf1(k,kC)_kGf2(k,kG)J  w  (12) 
Equation  (11)  permits us to write the  private capital—labour ratio as 
a  function  of  the  domestic  real  interest  rate  and  the  public  sector 
capital—labour ratio: 
k  = k(, kG);  k1  i_<0;  k2 
All  factors of production  are  assumed to be  complements, i0. 
FG>0  and FyG>0.  The last of these implies f12>0 and thus k2>0. 
The demand price for labour, w, can from (12) be written as: 
w  = (l_O)a(k,kt);  i  _cfil+kGfl2)>0;  a2 = _(kf12+kGf22)>0  (14)6 
With the marginal product of public sector capital  (f2)  positive and k4 
positive,  there will  be  positive  pure  profits  (k4f2 per  capita)  in  the 
economy if capital and labour are paid their marginal products.  We assume 
that the  ownership claims  to this stream of pure  profits  are not  traded 
internationally and  that they are perfect substitutes in domestic  private 
portfolios for domestic  interest—bearing debt.  The real per  capita value —12— 
of  these  eqoity  claims,  s,  given  in  cquato l  is  the  presert 
discounteo value of futute per capita pure pc'f5s  ?fer  sx1,  z. 
sit) =  e  dv 
After—tax pure profits pet capita are given by 
(l—O)y—rk-w  (16) 
In  the mode: under consideration this becomes: 
(l_A)kGf2  (16', 
Per capita taxes  ten be written as in equation  17)  with  -0ET7/L 
r  = f{k(,kGYkG]+ro 
(17) 
The  importance of the  assumption  that strong  rcongestion eifects" do 
not  affect  the  contrib.Ltion  of  public  capital  to  the  output  f an 
individual firm,  becomis  apparent  when  we  consider  the exteae  alternative 
given in the following  equation: 
KG  —  —  KG 
'1 =  F(Ki, 
— kG, Li),  kG>0;  i.e.  NK0,N) 
—  kG 
This  is  a  simple  special  case  of  a  general  formulation  of  congestion 
effects, according to which, for any K0, there exists a unique finite value 
of  N,  N(KG)  say,  such  that  f(K,N(K'))O.  This  critical  value  of  N  is 
assumed to increase with K°.  With free entry. pure profits will disappear 
ony if N=N, i.e.  in the special case under consideration if N=KG/kQ —l  3— 
Applying  the representative firm approach to this formulation we have, 
with free entry, 
(l—O)  f1(k,O)  r 
(l—o)(f(k,O)—kf1(k,o)) 
Under  this  specification  equilibrium output  or output  per  worker  is 
independent of the stock of public  sector capital.  A higher value of KG 
simply  induces more entry of new  firms, competing away any  pure profits. 
Each of the larger number of firms employs labour and private capital  in 
the same proportions as before  (at  given w and r).  Total output Y  and  the 
total private capital stock are independent of  gU,  For  reasons of space 
this  alternative  approach  to  social  overhead  capital  in  the  aggregate 
production function will not be pursued here] 
2c.  Private Consumption Behaviour 
Aggregate  private  consumption  behaviour  is  summarised  in  equations 
(18)—(23) 
q denotes per  capita "comprehensive" consumption,  i,e,  the  consumption 
of  the  single  commodity  plus  the  imputed value  of  the  "money  services" 
consumed by domestic households,  c is per capita consumption of the  single 
commodity and md the per capita demand for real money balances,  a denotes 
per capita financial wealth or non—human wealth, h the per  capita stock of 
human  capital.  q, c  md,  a and h are all measured  in terms  of domestic 
goods.  f*P  is real  per  capita private ownership  of net  foreign assets, 
which are assumed to be denominated in terms of foreign currency. q  5(a+h)  >0 
A  (r—n)a+w—r0—q 
h  rh4-,-0—v 
5 
— I r  (u  du 
h(t) = 
L  ds  (20') 
a  m+b+k±s±f*P 
= 9(i)q  0<tycl; ')0  (22) 
nd =  r_9(i)]  1-saisPO  (23) 
a 
The  model  of  consumer  behaviour  is  based  on  Well's  (1985) 
reinterpretation of Blanchard's (1985) model.  (See also Buiter  (1987a)). 
Each  individual  consumer  lives  forever  and  has  a  tine—additive  utility 
functional with  a  ooostant  pure rate of time preference,  5.  Instantaneous 
utility  is  the  logarithm  of a  homogeneous funotion  of  oonsumption  of  the 
one  good and  real money  balanoes.  Labour is supplied inelastically  This 
honogeneous  funoticn  is  increasing,  striotly  quasi—concave  and  twice 
continuously differentiable.  It satisfies  the  Inada conditions,  Internal 
capital  markets  are  perfect.  All  domestic  and  internationally  traded 
assets except money earn the sane expected pecuniary rate of return.  While 
each  individual  lives  forever,  there  is  a  constant  birt.h  rate  (and 
population growth rate) n>0,  Each individual earns the sane wage and pays 
the same taxes.  Human capital is therefore the same for all,  regardless of 
age. —15— 
Per  capita comprehensive consumption q  c+im  is a constant multiple, 
6,  of  the sum of  non—human  wealth,  a,  and human wealth, h,  as  shown in 
equation  (18).8  Equation  (19)  is the  equation of motion  for per  capita 
non—human wealth and equation (20)  that for human wealth.  Given a standard 
trsnsversality condition, (20) implies (20'):  human capital of those alive 
today  equals  the  present  discounted  value  of  the  future  after—tax  wage 
income earned by those currently alive. 
Note that aggregate consumption behaviour looks as though it represents 
the behaviour  of a representative consumer who  discounts his  future human 
capital  income  at  a higher  rate,  r,  than  the  rate  of  return  on  his 
non—human  capital, r—n.  The  excess of the human capttal  income discount 
rate  over  the  rate  of return  on  tangible  assets  is  n,  the  birth  rate. 
Absent operative intergenerational gift and bequest motives, private agents 
currently alive do not have as collateral (and  do not act as if they had as 
collateral) the future after—tax labour income of those yet to be born, the 
"new entrants".  A  positive birth rate (n>0)  therefore generates absence of 
debt  neutrality  :  holding  constant  the  path  of  current  and  future 
exhaustive public spending on goods and services, hulding constant the path 
of current and future distortionary tax rates and holding constant the path 
of current and future nominal money issues, changes in the path of lump—sum 
taxes  (which are  consistent  with  the  government  satisfying  its  solvency 
constraint) will  affect the  real  equilibrium of the  eocnomy.  With nO, 
debt neutrality prevails. 
Equation  (21)  defines  private  sector  non—human  wealth.  Note  that 
domestic  money, domestic—currency—denominated—public  debt,  equity and  the 
domestic capital stock are held  entirely by the domestic private sector. 
Aggregate  consumption  of  the  single  good,  c,  depends  positively  on 
comprehensive  consumption, q and  ambiguously on the real price of holding money balanoes,  the nominal intetest rate, i  (equation (22)).  The  demand 
for  real  money balanoes  inoreases with q and  deoreases  with  i  (equation 
(23)). 
rketeuilibriumandtheextetnalaooounts 
When  there  is  perfeot  international  oapital  mobility  and  perfeot 
substitutability  between  foreign  ourrenoy  denominated  bonds  and 
domestio—ourrenoy—denominated  bonds,  unoovered  nominal  interest  patity 
prevails as in equation (2a) 
i  i*+c  (24a) 
Since this is a one good world and  the  law of one prioe holds, this means 
that unoovered real interest parity also holds, as in equation (24b) 
r  i—r = i*—r*  r*  (24b) 
As the oountry is small it takes both i* and t* as  given. 
Let f* denote the real per oapita value of the nation a  (private plus 
publio  seotor's)  stook  of  net  foreign  assets,  i.e.  f*  f*p+f*G  The 
ourrent aooount of the balanre of payments  osn be written as in equation 
(25) where ii' denotes real pet oapits private oapital fotmation, i.e. 
iP  k+nk 
yooG_iP_iG+(r*.n)f*  (25) 
With  zero  international  oapital  mobility,  equations  (24s,b)  are 
inapplitable.  Instead we have fO, i.e.  absorption should equal national 
inoome.  For simplitity we assume  that in this oase we  also have  a zero 
stock  of net  foreign assets, i.e.  f*=O.  With zero  international  oapitsl 
mobility therefore, we have —17— 
y  c+cG+iP+iG  (26) 
We shall apply the zero international capital mobility restriction not only 
to  the  nation  as  a  whole,  but  to  each  of  the  two  domestic  sectors 
individually, ie. 
The  real after—tax rates of return on capital and domestic  government 
debt are equalised, so repeating equations (11)  and (13)  we have 
(l_O)f1(k,kt)  r  (27a) 
k = k[1--,kG] 
(27b) 
Labour  is  supplied  inelastically.  The  labour  force  grows  at  the 
exogenous  constant  proportional  rate n and  a  flexible  real  wage  ensures 
continuous full employment.  Equations (12)  and (14),  reproduced below, can 
therefore be interpreted as labour market clearing conditions 
(l_)(f_kf1_kGf2)  w  (28a) 
w  = (1_O)c,(k,kG)  (28b) 
The demand for real money balances equals the outstanding stock, i.e. 
ci  H  m =m 
(29) —18-- 
3.  Seigniorage and the exchange rate regime 
For reasons of space little attention is paid in this paper to the wide 
range of possible  (and actually existing)  exchange rate  regimes.  Only  a 
freely  floating  exchange  rate  and  a  crawling  peg  with  a  constant 
proportional  rate  of  depreciation  or  appreciation  are  considered 
explicitly.  Since we are focussing on the long—run inflation consequences 
of public  expenditure cuts,  any  exchange  rate  regime  that  is considered 
should be viable  in the long run.  Viability  has  several dimensions.  We 
consider two  long run seigniorage consistency and  international reserve 
sufficiency. 
3  a.  Long run seinioraepnsistenc 
In steady—state equilibrium all real per capita assets and liabilities 
of the  government are  constant  (i.e.  bk0=f00  and ink0) and  the  real 
interest rate r is constant.  0G,  rç,  8,  p0  n and r* are parameters.  In 
the  one  good  world  of  this  paper,  the  terms of  trade F are  of  course 
identically equal to unity and y=O.  What follows holds, however, also for 
models  with  endogenous  terms  of  trade  or  real  exchange  rate,  since  in 
steady state no real appreciation or depreciation occurs. 
Real per capita steady state seigniorage is therefore given by9 
(n+)m  cG_rO_Of(k,kG)+(r_r*)f*G+(n_pG)kG+(r_n)(b_f*C)  (30) 
Through  the money  demand function, we  can  determine which  rate(s) of 
inflation  (there may be more  than  one)  can  generate  the  required  steady 
state real seigniorage given in equation  (30).  The money demand  function 
given  in equation  (23)  together with  equations  (18),  (19)  ,  (20),  (27b), 




It should be noted that throughout we assume that n>0, n+ô>r and w—70>0J0 
Holding constant the other arguments of  (30)  and (31)  we can trace the 
cet.par. relationship between long—run  real per  capita seigniorage or the 
long—run  real per capita stock of high—powered money  and  the  (actual and 
expected) rate of inflation. 
For  a  number  of commonly  used  money  demand  functions  including  the 
linear  one  in  (32a)  and  the  log—linear  one  in  (32b)  the  long—run 
relationship between the inflation rare  (or  the  monecary  growth rate) and 
real seigniorage has the  Laffer curve" shape shown in Figure 1. 
m  = n—rnr  a43>O;  r<a3'  (32a) 
1mm  n'-0'r  '>0  (32h) 
For  the  linear demand function shown in Figures IA and lB and for the 
log—linear demand function shown in Figures lC and lD (both drawn with n=0) 
there is a unique finite long—run seigniorage maximizing rate of inflation 
(=(a/(2))—(n/2)  in he linear case,  =(l/)—n  in  che  log linear case). 
Such  a  unimodal  long—run  seigniorage  Laffer curve  would,  of course,  not 
exist if the money demand function were  the  rectangular hyperbola given in 
(32c) 
a  m'>O; 3'>0; r>—3"  (32c) 
3 +ir 
This money demand function, which would correspond to equation  (31)  in 
the  Cobb—Douglas  case  (i'=0)  and  with  r>0,  has  seigniorage  increasing 
(decreasing) forever with ir  if f3">n (if 13<n). —20— 
For the government's fiscal—financial—monetary strategy to he feasible 
if there is a seigniorage Laffer curve, the maximal amount of steady—state 
seigniorsge  5  should  obviously  be  no  less  than  the  value  required  to 
sstisfy the  steady—stste budget constraint  (30).  If there is a unimodal 
long—run  seigniorage Laffer curve  (and there are  consequently  two  steady 
state  rates  of  inflation  that  generate  any  given  feasible  amount  of 
long—run real seigniorage), it seems reasonable to assume that the lower of 
these  two  inflation  rates is actually chosen, by  the policy  makers  (and 
that we are therefore always on the revenue—efficient side of the long—run 
seigniorage Laffer curve) if there is a managed exchange rate regime.  With 
somewhat less confidence the lower inflation rate may be expected to emerge 
endogenously under  a floating  exchange  rate  regime.  No  rational  policy 
making process would ever drive the steady state inflation rate beyond the 
seigniorage  maximising  value,  as  in  addition  to  the  costs  of  higher 
inflation, there would also be a reduction in inflation tax revenues.  In 
what  follows we  assume  that  if  there  is  a  long—run  seigniorage  Laffer 
curve, it is unimodal. 
The  minimal  long—run  rate  of  inflation  implied  by  the  government's 
fiscal—financial—monetary strategy, 1, must be consistent with the long—run 
exchange  rate  rule.  In our model,  in which the  law of  one price holds, 
re+w* even outside the steady state.  However, even  if the real  exchange 
rate  is endogenous,  the steady state rate of depreciation of  the nominal 
exchange rate  must  equal the excess of the minimal long—run domestic rate 
of inflation required to generate the required steady state seigniorage, , 
over  the exogenous world rate of inflation, ir* (assumed  to be constant for 
simplicity), i.e. 
(33) —21— 
As  our formal model  is non—stochastic  and  strategic behaviour  is not 
considered, it does not matter whether we view  (33)  as the steady state of 
an  exclienge rate management rule  (i.e.  a rule for E or  its  rate of change 
with  the  stock  of  international  reserves  and  the  money  stock  adjusting 
endogenously)  or as  the  steady state  of  a  reserve  stock or money stock 
management rule  (i.e.  a rule for M or R* with the exchange rate adjusting 
endogenously). 
In most  of what  follows it is convenient  to interpret exchange  rate 
behaviour  as  if  it  were  generated  by  a  crawling  peg  exchange  rate 
management  rule which  generates  the real  seigniorage  required  to satisfy 
the  government  budget  identity  at  each  instant,  given  exogenously 
determined  values  of  cC,  o,  t,  b  and  f*G  and  without  any  maxi" 
devaluations or revaluations, i.e. without any discontinuous changes in the 
level of  the nominal exchange  rate.  The  (managed) proportional  rate  of 
change of the nominal exchange rate,  c will  in genera? vary over  time in 
response  to  changes  in cC or iC  Such an exchange  rate management  rule 
mimics  a  freely floating exchange rate  except for  the  absence (under the 
exchange rate management rule) of discontinuous changes in E even at those 
instants  when  "news" about the  fundamentals reaches the private  sector. 
With a predetermined nominal exchange rate, any stock—shift changes in the 
demand for real money balances  (say in response to a change in the nominal 
interest  rate)  will be reflected in changes in  the  stock of international 
reserves.  As regards the behaviour of real money balances  (per capita), m, 
this regime is identical to a freely floating exchange rate regime.  Under 
the  latter regime, discontinuous changes  in the nominal exchange  rate  in 
response  to  news  replace  discontinuous  changes  in official  international 
reserves.  The  exchange  rate  management  interpretation  may  make  the 
selection of seigniorage revenue efficient solutions more plausible. —22— 
3b.  International reserve sufficiency 
Current conventional wisdom on  the  collapse of managed  exchange  rate 
regimes  (see  eg  Krugman  (1979),  Flood  and  Garber  (1984)  and  Obstfeld 
(1986))  implies  that  a  collapse  can  occur  even  if  there  is  long—run 
seigniorage consistency as just defined.  Even if the  government achieves 
an  inflation  rate  and  nominal  exchange  rate  depreciation  rate  that 
guarantee  long—run  seigniorage  consistency,  (and even  if  the  government 
satisfies  its  intertemporal solvency constraint at each instant, in or out 
of  steady state), international  foreign exchange  reserves  could  still be 
declining: nominal domestic credit expansion could exceed the change in the 
nominal money stock demanded in equilibrium.  This can occur even when c4, 
r,  kG,  pG,  b and  f*G are  constant  :  the  loss  of official  international 
reserves  would  be  balanced  in  that  case  by  a  reduction  in  government 
borrowing  abroad :  R*_B*  (n+ir_e)(R*_B*)  is consistent with any value of 
R* (and thus,  ultimately, of R*). 
In the model under  consideration,  international  reserves  and  foreign 
borrowing  carry  the  same  interest  rate.  The  government's  solvency 
constraint is therefore unaffected by equal offsetting changes in R* and in 
*•  Note  that if reserves have a lower interest rate than government debt 
(as  would be the case under a pure gold standard with  a positive  nominal 
interest rate (see  Buiter 1987)),  then financing a given deficit by running 
down  reserves  rather than by borrowing  abroad would gradually  strengthen 
government  solvency.  Similarly,  a  stock—shift  open  market  sale  to 
replenish the stock of reserves would, because the authorities incur a high 
interest rate liability in exchange for a low interest  rate asset, weaken 
government solvency immediately. 
As shown in Buiter  (1986),  when the interest rates on reserves  and on 
government debt are the same and when  a government is solvent for any rate —23— 
of domestic credit expansion (however low), then the government is solvent 
for any other rate of domestic credit expansion (however high).  There can 
be  no  international  reserve problem"  as  long  as  there  is no  solvency 
problem. 
The  literature  just  referred  to  "creates"  a  reserve  problem  by 
postulating  some ad—hoc  lower bound  on the  stock  of reserves  (or  in  the 
context  of our  model  on the  real per  capita  stock  of  reserves)  and  by 
denying  the  government  unlimited  lines  of  credit  even  ehen  solvency  is 
guaranteed.  If  the  actual  stock  of  reserves  falls  below  the  critical 
threshold  level,  the  current managed  exchange  rate  regiae  collapses  and 
something  else  takes  its  place.  This  "something  else"  can  be  a  'free 
float" (possibly followed by an eventual return to another managed rate or 
rule), a maxi—devaluation,  the imposition of capital or excoange controls 
or any other conceivable scheme. 
I shall assume that in steady state, domestic credit expansion  is such 
that any reserve threshold there may be is not breached. 
Outside the steady state, the initial stock of reserves is assumed  to 
be  sufficient  to  keep  reserves  above  the  exogenously  imposed  reserve 
threshold  (if  there  is  one),  despite any  stock—shift  or gradual  reserve 
losses  incurred  during  the  adjustment  process.  The  focus  is  therefore 
firmly  on  solvency  rather  than  on  (badly  understood)  international 
liquidity problems that may occur despite solvency.12 —24— 
4.  Long runeffects_nfljonoLiic  ending cuts 
Putting together equations (30) and  (31) we obtain equation (34). 
c4_r0_Of(k(,kG),k0)+(r_r*)f*0+(n_pG)kG+(r_n)(b_f*t) 
(34) 
Remember  that n,,8,r0,cG,r*  and  p4 are taken as exogenous.  The government 
financing rule (or an (ad hoc)  internal debt ceiling) keeps b constant in 
and  out of steady state.  The  government financing rule  (or  an  (ad hoc) 
external  debt  ceiling)  keeps  f*G  constant  in and  out  of  steady  state. 
Since 4i4nk4,  the  steady state  public sector  capital  stock  is  simply 
given by  k4=i4/n. 
The  cases  of perfect  capital mobility  and  zero  capital  mobility  are 
considered in turn 
Perfect international capital mobilitT 
With  perfect  international  capital  mobility  (rr*)  the  long—run 
effects  on  inflation  of  changes  in  public  consumption  spending,  public 
sector  capital  formation  and  lump—sum  taxes  are  given  by  equations 
(35a,b,c).  Note  that  because  the  real  interest  rate  is  constant  the 
nominal interest rate varies one—for—one with the rate of inflation. 
.L.  a1f4  (35a) 
dc4 
a11b12  (35b) 
a11b1p  (35c) —25— 
where 
r  (n+)  1 
a11  fftui()7+hh7)i  (36a) 
b12 =  —  -  [_ _+fJ +  (n+)(1_)6(l_o)kG[fllf22f12]  (36b)  "  iii.  i(n+&—r)r  f-j1 
b13  s)-6m  — 1  -1  (36c) 
w—r0 
The coefficient a11 is positive if we are on the revenue—efficient side 
of the  seigniorage Laffer curve, where the elasticity of money demand with 
respect to the inflation rate is less than I in absolute value)-3  A cut 
in public consumption spending reduces the amount of real seigniorage that 
needs  to be  extracted.  In  the  revenue—efficient  region  of  the  Laffer 
curve,  lower real  seigniorage means  lower  inflation  (see equations  (35s) 
and  (36a)).  Note  that since money  is  the  "residual  mode  of financing 
lower public consumption spending does not imply lower explicit taxes. 
The  effect of higher lump—sum taxes on long—run  inflation is actually 
ambiguous  in this model.  As  shown  in equations  (35c)  and  (36c). while 
higher lump sum taxes reduce the amount of long—run seigniorage required to 
satisfy  the  government budget  constraint, it also  reduces the demand  for 
money  (at given nominal and  real interest rates), which  is  an increasing 
function  disposable  labour  income.  If  in  the  initial  steady  state 
seigniorage  is  less  than  disposable  labour  income  (which  is  likely 
empirically), higher lump—sum  taxes will  lead to lower  long—run inflation 
(in the revenue—efficient region of the long—run seigniorage Laffer curve). —26— 
Lower public sector capital formation may (but need not) lead to higher 
long—run  inflation  (see equations  (35b)  and  (35c)).  Cet.par.  it reduces 
the  deficit one—for—one,  thus  reducing  long—run  required  seigniorage  and 
(in the seigniorage—revenue—efficient region) long—run inflation.  This we 
shall call the expenditure  effect, given by the  first term on the RHS of 
(36b).  However,  there  may be  direct  cash  returns  to  the  government, 
asociated with  its  ownership of the public sector capital stock.  If  the 
(net)  rate of return pG exceeds the real growth rate n (or equivalently if 
pGkC exceeds G) the direct effect of lower public sector capital formation 
on long—run  seigniorage and  (in the seigniorage—revenue—efficient  region) 
on inflation will be positive.  Empirically, it is of course quite possible 
for  pG  to be  negative.  The  permanent  subsidisation  (for  good  or bad 
reasons)  of secular public  sector loss makers would  be a  case  in point. 
This direct revenue effect is given by  the  second term _pC/n on the RES of 
equation (36b). 
There is a further possible effect of a lower long—run  stock of public 
sector capital on the deficit,  seigniorage and  inflation.  Lower k' means 
lower  national  income,  both  given  k  and by  inducing  a  reduction  in k 
(assuming f12>O) 
.  Lower  national  income means  lower  income—related  tax 
receipts if 0 is positive.  This indirect revenue effect is captured  in the 
third term on the RHS of equation  (36b). 
Finally, there  is  an effect on  the  demand  for money, captured by the 
last term on the P.}IS of  equation  (36b).  A lower value of k' means a lower 
real wage  (since f11f22—f122>O by concavity).  Cet.par.  a lower real wage 
means  a  lower demand  for  real  money  balances;  in  the  revenue—efficient 
segment  of  the  seigniorage  Laffer  curve  this  implies  higher  inflation. 
This will be referred to as the money demand effect. —27-- 
In the seigniorage—revenue—efficient region, the expenditure effect of 
a  cut  in public  sector capital formation  reduces  inflation.  The  direct 
revenue effect is ambiguous even as regards its sign.  The indirect revenue 
effect will  worsen  inflation as  long  as  the  marginal  product  of  public 
sector  capital  is  positive  (f2>0)  or  public  and  private  capital  are 
complements  (f12>0).  8  is  likely  to be  quite  small  in many  developing 
countries,  however.  The  money  demand  effect  also  raises  inflation. 
Whatever  the  scale measure,  income  or wealth  term  in  the  money  demand 
function, it is likely to be adversely affected, cet.par. by a lower social 
overhead  capital stock as  long as the marginal  product  of  public sector 
capital is positive. 
Zero international capital mobility 
When  there is international  capital mobility,  domestic  income equals 
private plus public absorption, i.e.  equation (26)  holds. 
Substituting  for  output  using  the  production  function,  for  private 
consumption  using  equations  (18),  (19),  (20)  and  (22)  and  for  private 
investment using the steady—state condition iPnk, we obtain 
r  1G  n  r  iG  i 
f[k[H,_] 
(37)  1-On 
Equations  (34)  (with k0'=i0n1)  and  (37)  can  be  used  to  solve  for  the 
long—run equilibrium values of the rate of inflation and the now endogenous 
real interest rate. 
The  long—run  comparative statics of changes  in c0,  it and  rçj can  be 
obtained from equations (38a—k). —28— 
aj  a12  d7r  b11  b12  b13 
] 
r  dct 1 
=  diG  (38a) 
a2  a22 i  I  dr  i  I b  b22  b23 i  [  dy0  I 
r  (j+r) 
a11  md-.  (1_+i')}  (38b) 
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Equation  (34)  defines the long—run equilibrium seigniorage schedule AA0 
or AA1  in Figure  2.  The  long—run  income—absorption equilibrium schedule —29— 
corresponding to equation  (37) is drawn as BB in Figure 2.  The  slope of 
the AA schedule in lr—r space is given by 
d  — 
dr  a11 
The  coefficient  a12  given  in  (38c)  measures  the  effect of a higher  real 
interest  rate  (cet.par.) on  the  "demand  for  seigniorage",  i.e.  on  the 
inflation—and—growth—corrected government  deficit  on  the  RHS  of equation 
(34),  relative to its  effect on the "supply of seigniorage", (n±lr)m, on the 
LHS of  equation  (34).  A higher  value  of r  raises  the  deficit both  by 
raising the  interest  to  be  paid  on  the  debt  and  by  generating  a  lower 
private capital  stock,  output and  income—related tax receipts.  These  two 
effects are captured by the terms b and —(O/(l—O))  f1/f11 respectively in 
equation  (38c).  Cet.par.  a higher  real  interest rate  also  represents  a 
higher nominal interest rate,  This nominal interest rate effect will  tend 
to reduce m,  the  seigniorage tax  base,  since  l—+iq'>O.  A  higher  real 
interest  rate will,  however,  also  raise  the  long—run  ratio of  non—human 
wealth to disposable wage income.  It will also, provided r>(n÷6)/2, raise 
the long—run ratio of comprehensive consumption q to disposable wage income 
and thus raise 
Finally,  a  higher  real  interest  rate  will  tend  to  be  associated 
(through a lower value of k) with a lower real wage.  This effect, measured 
by the third term on the RHS of  (38c)  will tend to  duce m.  We will only 
consider the a  priori more plausible case in which a12 is positive,  i.e.  a 
higher value of r raises the demand for seigniorage relative to its  supply. 
(Note  that we  also  assume  throughout  that  the nominal  interest  rate  is 
positive).  The coefficient a11, already discussed, will be positive if the 
inflation elasticity of money demand is less than unity in absolute value, —30— 
negative otherwise.  Without a seigniorage Laffer curve, the  curve  is 
downward—sloping as  shown  in Figure 2.  The AAi  schedule  represents  the 
unimodal  long—run  seigniorage  Laffer  curve  generated  by  an  inflation 
elasticity of money demand which  is below unity  in absolute value  for low 
values  of - and rises monotonically with i  crossing  unity for some finite 
value of ir. 
The slope of the BB schedule in v—r space is given by 
—a22 
°'  EB  a21 
Homotheticity  is consistent with any  sign for '  as  long  as  l—±i'0. 
In what  follows it's  assumed  that  ,')0,  i.e.  given  total  comprehensive 
consumption of goods and money services, an increase in the real price of 
money services does not reduce the demand for goods.  This implies a210. 
The  coefficient a22 will be positive if cet.par. a higher real interest 
rate raises  absorption  relative  to  output.  Assuming  that  the  marginal 
product of private  capital  exceeds  the  real  growth  rate  (f1>n),  the  last 
term  on  the RHS  of  (38e) will be  positive.  r'>0  makes  the  first—term  on 
the Bus  of  (38e) non—megative.  A higher value  of r also tends  to raise the 
ratio of comprehensive  consumption q  to disposable  wage income (if n+l<2r), 
so  the second term  on  the PBS  of  (38e)  is positive.  Human  wealth  is  lower, 
however,  when r is higher and this will make the third term on the RHS of 
(38e)  negative.  Figure 2 shows both  the  case where  a22 is positive  (the 
downward—sloping  curve  50B0)  and  the  case  where  a22  is  negative  (the 
upward—sloping curve B151).  For reasons of space we only consider the case 
where  in the  low—inflation  (seigniorage—revenue—efficient) equilibrium  at 
E0,  the B0B0 curve  cuts the AA0 (or  AA1) curve from abovej5 -31- 
A cut  in public consumption spending  shifts the  long-run  seigniorage 
equilibrium schedule A0A0  to the left  in Figure 3a and  3b.  (We  consider 
the case of the unimodal long—run seigniorage Laffer curve).  If a higher 
real interest rate  raises long—run  absorption relative  to long—run  output 
(a22>O), the long—run output—absorption equilibrium schedule  is negatively 
sloped.  It shifts to the right when cG  is cut  as in Figure 3a.  In  the 
seigniorage—efficient  region,  the  equilibrium  moves  from  F0  to  F1 
inflation falls and the  real interest rate rises.  Note that an increase in 
the real interest rate  is required  in the long run because, with  a22>0, a 
higher  real  interest  rate  is  required  to  boost  absorption  and  reduce 
output,  thus  restoring  output—absorption  balance  following  the  cut  in 
public  consumption  spending.  In  the  seigniorage—inefficient  region  the 
stationary equilibrium  in Figure 3a moves  from E0  to  E1.  The  inflation 
rate rises while  the  effect on the  real interest rate  is ambiguous.  If 
given q, a rise in the nominal interest rate has only a small effect on the 
consumption  of  goods,  Le.  if c/  is  small,  the  output—absorption 
equilibrium schedule will be near vertical and r will increase. 
Figure  3b shows the case where a22<0 and  a higher value  of  r reduces 
absorption relative to output.  In the seigniorage—revenue—efficient region 
the equilibrium moves  from E0 to E1 or Ej.  The  real interest rate  falls 
and the  inflation  rate either  falls  (at  F1)  or  rises  (at  Ej).  In  the 
seigniorage—revenue—inefficient  region  the  stationary  equilibrium  moves 
from E0 to  or Ej. 
An  increase  in  lump—sum  taxes  will  shift  the  long—run  seigniorage 
equilibrium  schedule to the left  if b13—a/(w—r0)]—l<0  as seems plausible 
empirically.  This  is shown both in Figure 4a and in Figure 4b.  If a22>O 
(a  higher  real  interest  rate  raises  long—run  absorption  relative  to 
long—run real output) the absorption output equilibrium schedule shifts to —32-- 
the  right  as  shown  in  Figure  4a.  If  a22<O,  the  absorption—output 
equilibrium schedule shifts to the left as in Figure 4b.  In Figure 4a the 
seigniorage—revenue—efficient equilibrium shows a higher real interest rate 
and a lower rate of inflation. 
A lower rate of public sector capital formation, unlike a  cut in public 
sector  consumption  spending,  need  not  shift  the  long—run  equilibrium 
seigniorage schedule  to the left.  Figures 5a and  5b show the case where 
the  expenditure  effect  is dominated  by  the  direct  and  indirect  revenue 
effects  and  the  money  demar,d  effect  i.e.  b12<O  and  the  long—run 
equilibrium seigniorage schedule shifts to the  right. 
The  direction  of  the  shift  of  the  long—run  output—absorption 
equilibrium  schedule  as G  decreases  is ambiguous,  There  is the  direct 
expenditure effect on absorption (the term —I in (38j))-  which is reInforced 
by the reduction in long—run private consumption due to the  lower real wage 
associated with the lower stock of public sector capital (the term 
2 
—(l—O)ik  fu—i1f22  6-r)r i 
in  (381)).  Finally,  there is  the depressing effect on absorption due  to 
the lower long—run rate of private capital formation, reflecting the lower 
value  of  k that  accompanies  a  lower value  of  k0  (the  term  f12/f11  in 
(38j)).  Absorption  therefore  declines  unambiguously.  Output,  however, 
also  falls, both  through the  direct  effect  of  a  lower value  of A0 and 
through  the  depressing  effect  on  k  of  a  lower  value  of  kG  (the  term 
l/n(f2—f1f12/f11) in (38j)). 
in Figure 5a we consider the case where a22 is positive  (a higher real 
interest rate raises long—run absorption relative to long—run output) and 
b22  is positive,  (i.e.  a  lower value  of i0 reduces  output by  more  than —33— 
absorption).  The output—absorption equilibrium schedule shifts to the left 
in this case,  moving the seigniorsge—revenue—efficient equilibrium from Eq 
to  E1.  The  long—run  responses  of both  the  inflation  rate and  the  real 
interest rate in the  seigniorage—revenue efficient  region are unambiguous: 
a  cut  in  public  sector  capital  formation  leads  to  a  higher  rate  of 
inflation and a lower real interest rate.  The higher race of inflation is 
needed  to  extract  the  larger real  seigniorage  that  ia required  and  the 
lower real interest rate raises output relative to absorption. 
In Figure Sb we continue to assume that  ia poaitive, but b22 is now 
assumed  to be negative:  a  cut  in public  aector capital  formation  lowers 
absorption more  than output.  The  output—abaorption  equilibrium schedule 
moves  to  the  right  in  this  case,  In  the  seigniorage—revenue—efficient 
region the responae  of the  inflation rate and  the real  interest rate are 
ambiguous.  It  is possible  for  the  inflation  rate  to  rise and  the  real 
interest rate to fall (the case of a very small shift to the right of the 
output—absorption  equilibrium  schedule,  not  shown  in  Figure  Sb).  The 
inflation rate can rise while the real interest rate riaes  (from Eq to E1 
in Figure Sb)  or the inflation rate can fall while  the real intereat rate 
rises (from Eç to E2 in Figure Sb). 
With  a22czO we  obtain  in  the  seigniorage—revenue—efficient  region  an 
unambiguously  positive  effect of  a cut  in public  sector capital formation 
on  the  rate  of  inflation  when  b22<O,  i.e.  when  a cut  in public  sector 
capital  formation  reduces  absorption  by  more  than  output.  The  real 
interest  rate  could  rise  if  q'  is  large  and  the  output—absorption 
equilibrium  schedule  shifts  to  the  left  only  slightly;  a  lower  real 
interest  rate  is more  likely, however,  It  is easily  checked  that with 
a22<O and b22>O, a cut  in public sector capital formation lowers the real —34— 
interest rate and has  an ambiguous  effect on  the  rate of inflation in the 
seigniorage—revenue—efficient region.16 
The  two  cases  where  a  cut  in  public  sector  capital  formation 
unambiguously raises the  long—run rate of inflation are depicted in Figures 
Ia and 5c.  In each  case the seigniorage—revenue—efficient equilibrium  is 
considered,  i.e.  a11>O,  In  addition  a cut  in  public  sector  capital 
formation is assumed to  raise  (at  given values  of r  and  the  "demand  for 
aaigniorage"  relative to the  "supply of seigniorage", i.e.  b12<O.  Finally, 
vs  have  one  of  the  two  following  output—absorption  equilibrium 
configurations:  either  the  case  of  Figure  Sm  in  vb,ich  a  higher  roal 
interest  rate raises  absorption  relative  to  output  (apprO)  and  a  cut  in 
public  sector  capital  formation  reduces  absorption  by  less  than  output 
or  the case  of  Figure Sc  in which  a higher  real  interest  rate 
raises output relative  to absorption  (a22<O) and a  cut  in public  sector 
capital  formation  reduces absorption by .ore  than  output  (b22<O)  Note 
that  these are sufficient conditions only.  As Figure Sb shows, they are 
not necessary, —35— 
5.  Stability and dynamic adluetment 
Perfect capital mobility 
Tinder perfect capital mobility,  the dynamic adjustment of the  economy 
is given by equations (39)—(44). 
— (r*—flq—ona  (39) 
a = (r*—n)a+(l—O)u(k(,k),k)-rp-q  (40) 
(41) 
th  c0÷i0_0f(k(kG),kG) p0k0(r*-n)d—(n+r)m  (42) 
m = 1l_q(r*)0  r+r  J 
(44) 
Exogenous are r*, pG r, 0,  i0,  cTi,  n and . 
Note  that with  the real  interest rate  fixed exogenously,  q,  a and k0 
are determined independently of a, r and e. 
The subsystem represented by equations (39),  (40)  and (41) governing q, 
a and kG is (locally) a saddlepoint with one unstable and two stable roots 
(governing  the  non—predetermined  atate variable  q  and  the  predetermined 
state variables a and kG 17 provided  (45) holds 
(45) 
Since we assume that the real  interest rate  is positive,  this is the 
viability  condition  r*<n+  required  for  positive  steady—state 
consumption. 
18 —36— 
From equations  (42),  (43)  and  39)  we can  solving out m and ft.  obtain 
*  as  a  function  of  in  q,  a,  Ic4  and  the  exogenous  variables.  The 
coefficient  of  *  on  it  in  the  linear approximation to this  * equatin  ii 
also  the  fourth characteristic  root  of  the  linearised  q,a,k4,r} sysen 
che root  "governing" it)  This coefficient,  611  say,  is given by 
Ui  =  —  (n+)  (t51  .L  l—q±irj 
It is easily checked  that,  provided  n±r>O  611 is positive  if  and  only 
if a11  is positive.  The  coefficient  a11  given  in  (38b)  is positive  at 
reigniorage—revenue—efficient stationary  equilibrium,  negative othervis 
around a  seigniorage—revenue—efficiecit  a taticnary  equilibrium  the  d manic 
vstem  governing  q,  a.  k4  and  it  will  have  two  stable  and  tw  -rstabie 
haracteristic roots.  There  is a  unique  continuously  convergent  solution 
rrsiectory and,  after any  shock,  a  unique set  nf  initial values of 'i  and  it 
that  are  consistent  with  convergence  to  the  new  seigniorage recon'ie 
"6ficent  long—run  equii'brium.  Around  a  seigniorage—revenue—ineffi'  ient 
long—run  equilibrium,  is negative  and  there  is  a  local  continuum  of 
initial values  for  ir  (but not  for q)  that are consistent with  convergence 
to  the  seigniorage—revenue—inefficient long—run  equilibrium.  Note  that 
this analysis is  applicable both  to  the freely floating  exchange  rate  case 
and  to the managed exchange  rate case outlined in Section  3a. 
aitslmobilit 
With  zero  international  capital mobility,  the behaviour  of  q  and  a  is 
only  independent  of  the  behaviour  of  the  inflation  rate  if  aggregate 
consumption  of  goods,  c=t(i)q is  independent of  the nominal  interest  race 
('O).  Unless  this  is  the  case,  goods market  equilibrium  and  thereby 
capital formation will  depend on  it.  With  k dependent on  it,  a  and  q also —37— 
can only by determined simultaneously with  lr.  The relevant dynamic system 
is given in equations (47)—(52). 
4 =  ((l)f1(k,kG)_)q5na  (47) 
A  ((l—O)f1(k,k0)—na+(l-A)u(k,k0)-r0-q  (48) 
(49) 
k = f(k,k0)—nk-rj((i—O)f1(k,k0)+)q-c—i0  (50) 
th  cG±irpf(k,kG)_pGr(i_8)fi(k,kC)_n)b  (n)m  (51) 
l—q( (1_I)fi(kkG)+r) 
I  — 
L  (l)f1(k,ku)+  J 
- 
As  the analytical characterisation of the  unrestricted five—dimensional 
dynamic system given in equations (47)—(52) is too messy and complicated, I 
restrict  the  analysis  to the  case where  q'=O -and  the classical dichotomy 
holds. 
Note  that when q'0,  real per  capita seigniorage j increases  with  the 
inflation  rate  if  r-'ri  (decreases  if  r<n).  We  only consider  dynamically 
efficient equilibria with  r>n.  This means  that  the long—run  equilibrium 
seigniorage schedule  is always downward—sloping in 7r—r  space  there is no 
seigniorage—revenue—inefficient segment  The output—absorption equilibrium 
schedule  is vertical  when  =0.  Changes in  ct,  i  and r  will  however 
shift this vertical  schedule as before.  In the linearised version of  the 
dynamic model, the characteristic root governing  (or m) is r—n-9  With 
r>n  this  root  is  therefore  unstable,  as  desired  for  a  locally  unique 
solution. 
- —38— 
The  linear approximation to the aubaystem governing q,  a, k and kG is 
given in equation  (53) 
q  r—&  —on q(l—O)f11  q(l-6)f2  1  q 
4  -l  r—n _(l_G)Uk.a)fll÷kGfl2)  —(l-O)((k—a)fi2±ktf22)  a 
k  —q  0  f1—n  f2  k 
Lk0J  10  0  0  —n  k° 
The  root  governing  k4  ia again  —n.  For  there  to be  a  saddiepcint 
configuration  that  matohea  the  atruoture  of  one  non—predetermined  stats 
variable  (q)  and three predetermined onea  (a.  k and k0),  two of the other 
three roots  should be  stable and  one  unstable.  The  determinant  of  the 
three—by—three  submatrix obtained by deleting  the  last  row and  cotunn of 
the coeffioient matrix in equation (53)  should therefore be positive, i.e 
(n—f1)  I  is1 
(n+5—r)r—qon{k+kt__j—o(n+5—2o) 
<0  (54)  ll(1—0)  f11 
Provided  n+5>r  (which  is  required  for  positive  steady  state 
consumption), equation (54)  is equivalent to the condition a22<0 (see (SEe) 
with  ij'=O).  When  the  output—absorption equilibrium  sohedule  is verticsl 
therefore,  the  situation  depioted  in  Figure  Sm  cannot  arise  when  the 
dynamio  system  has,  looally,  the  appropriate  saddlepoint  configuration. 
This leaves the configuration shown in Figure So as the only one for which 
inflation  unambiguously  rises  as  publio  sector  capital  formation  is 
reduted.  The intuition is clear.  Private capital deepening  (knO)  means a 
lower  real  interest  rate.  Unless  a  lower  real  interest  rate  raises 
absorption  relative  to  output  (a22<0),  the  rate  of  private  capital 
formation increases further, setting off an unstable process.  (When q'>O, 
the  condition  that  a22  be  negative  is  not  necessary  for  saddlepoint 
stability) —39— 
The  eigenvalues  of  a  matrix  are  continuous  functions  of  the 
coefficients of  that  matrix.  Small  perturbations  of ' from  zero will 
therefore  not  cause  a  qualitative  change  in  the  local  saddlepoint 
configuration just discussed.  For  ip'  far  from zero  (including any  model 
with a seigniorage-revenue—inefficient  region) numerical simulation methods 
are  required  to  determine  local  (and  of  course  global)  stability 
characteristics. —40— 
6.  Conclusions 
The  answer  to  the  question  can  public  spending  cuts  he 
inflationary?' is a clear "yes'.  The paper specifies the conditions under 
which a cut in public spending can peraanently raise the rate of inflation. 
Monetary  financing  is taken  to be  the  "residual"  financing  node,  Real 
public spending per capita (current and capital) is taken to be exogenous. 
So are  the share  of  income—related  taxes in  GOP,  COP—independent  real  per 
capita  taxes  and  the  real  per  capita  public  debt,  both  internal  and 
external.  This  set—up  helps  us  pose  the  issue clearly (it is  one  of  thc 
two  fiscal—financial  regimes  considered  in  Sargent  and  TAallare' s 
"Unpleasant Monetarist  Arithmetic  Paper" (1981))  and it also may be  a quite 
reasonable  approximation to the  real—world situation of a number of highly 
indebted semi—industrial countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Boaril. 
These  countries  face  the  need  to  reduce  the  public  sector  deficit. 
They  tend  to be  credit-rational  in  the  private  international  financial 
aarkets  and  are  unable  or reluctant  to  add  to  the  internal  public  debt 
burden.  Raising revenues  (which tend to be a low proportion  of national 
income relative  to those found in most  industrial countries) often appeara 
to be  politically  or  administratively  infeasible.  Barring  internal  or 
external  debt  repudiation  (or  economically equivalent  capital  levies  on 
public  debt  holders),  this  leaves  public  expenditure  cuts  as  the  only 
instrument of fiscal retrenchment.  The paper emphasises and elaborates the 
important distinction between cuts in public consumption expenditure which 
will  tend  to  reduce  the  deficit2°  and  cuts  in  public  sector  capital 
formation  which  may  have  the  perverse  effect  of  increasing  the  deficit. 
This will  happen  if the  expenditure effect  is swamped by  the  direct  and 
indirect effects  of  a reduced public  sector capital  stock  on  government 
revenues. -41- 
if  tbey  increase  the  (inflation—and—real--growth—corrected) public 
sector deficit, the cuts in public sector capital formation will raise the 
"demand for  seigniorage revenue".  Such cuts are also  likely to lower the 
demand  for money  (at  a  given  inflation rate  and  real  interest  rate>  by 
reducing the  scale factor (real income1 in the .Toney demand function.  This 
reduces  the  "supply  of  seigniorage  revenue.  In  the 
seigniorage revenue efficient  portion of  the  seigniorage  Laffer  curve", 
the price of seigniorage, ic. the rate of inflation, will increase. 
When the  domestic  cal  interest rate  is governed  by  the  world  real 
interest rate,  fhe  empirtca tnformation required to determine  ,fneth"r an 
economy finds  lself  in  the  situation  oat  outlined,  is  rather  linited 
Needed  are  (I)  an  estimate  of  the  hgh  powered  money  demand  function, 
including an estimate of the effect of the public sector capital stock on 
the  "scale factor" in the money  demand function,  (2;  an  estimate  of the 
production  function which  includes the contribution  of the  public sector 
capital stock  21 and  (3)  an estimate of the gcvernment  rovenue fonccfon 
When the domestic real interest rate is en.Jogenous,  things are consederably 
more  complicated  as  private consumption  and  nquilibriom  L  the  domestic 
credit market now have to be modelled. 
A major caveat in interpreting these results is that they are  concerned 
with  long—run  (steady—state>  effets,  The  adjustment  dynamics  which 
supported  the  long—run comparative statics in addition  did not  allow for 
any  kind  of  non—Walrasian  equilibrium  in  the  labour market,  the  output 
market  or  the  credit  narket.  Demand-deficient,  Keynesian  temporary 
equilibria in response to public expenditure cuts were not considered, but 
may well be an important part  of  the  story in the  larger semi—industrial 
debtor countries. -  —42-- 
The  assumption  made  in  the  paper  that  real  government  revcnue  is 
independent  of the rat of  inflation is unrealistic.  With  low  rates  cf 
inflation,  "bracket creep'  in income tsx  systems thst are  progrea'-i ;e  i 
nominal terms makes for a positwe relationship between the price l-we  and 
the ral tax  burden,  This  is unlikely  to be  important  in most  of  the 
semi—industrial  debtor  countries,  as  they  tend not  to  have  (de  facto 
crogressiwe  tax  structures  More  important  is  the  erosion  of  rca: ax 
receipts  at high  rates  of  inflation  due  to  tax  collection  lags  and  a 
tsilure to charge and/or collect the appropriate interest rste  on c  -rdu€ 
—axes tsee Tanzi (1978)). 
Pinally,  when  public  sector capital formation  is  interpreted  ic  P-s 
'-roadeat  possible sense (as  it should be for the purposes of this paper  as 
soy publ4.c  outlays that yield a stream of future returns, it is lokey  that 
some of the expenditure  on communicatoons  transportation,  education  otc 
which  are classified  as current will  in fact  enhance  the  future  revenue 
taP-ing capacity  of  the  government.  Indeed  some  current  spending 
'ubP-c  administration,  :aw enforcement) may  have  an  immediate  efiect 
current public revenues. 
Thile  it  is  not  difficult  to  come  up  with  horror  stories  about 
instances  of wasteful  or  socially undesirable public  expenditure, i ray 
not be as simple to ensure that the broad—brush cuts so often proposed  aod 
occassionally  implemented)  do  in  fact  achieve  their  declared  purpose  of 
athiewing  a lasting  reduction  in the public sector deficit  and  a  lower rate 
of  inflation, —43— 
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author  and  should  not  be  attributed  to  the  World  Bank  or  to  its 
sffiliated organisations.  The designations employed, tne  presencation 
of material,  and  any maps  used  it  this  document  are  solely  for  thr 
convenience  of  the  reader  and  do  not  imply  the  expresion  of  any 
opinion whatsoever  on  the  part  of  the  Worlm  Bank  or  i's  sffiIace. 
concerning the  legal status of any country, terrtorv, city,  area. or 
of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of  its  boundaries, 
or national s'fiflacions. 
Running  down  foreign excnsnge  reserves  is  inclded  in  net  yternsl 
borrowing by the psblic sector. 
2  In the  cases of  the  linear or log-l1nesr noney  denanJ  Functions  the 
absolute value  of the elasticity of money  demand with  respect to  the 
nominal interest  rate increases with  the nominal  interest  rste.  The 
long—run  seigniorege Leffer curve (holding coustent  the rs. interest 
rste  and  the  real  scale  variable  in  the  money  demand  function)  is 
uninodsi in this case. 
3  In Hall  (1987),  the real rate of return  on  high—powered money  is kept 
constant  through policy by varying  the nominal  interest rste on base 
money  with the (expected) rate of inflstion 4  Exceptions in the form of Keynesian models with more then 100 pet cent 
"financial  crowding out" are reviewed e.g.  in Buiter (1985). 
S  Some authors refer to xm or to (n+)m aa the inflation tax, 
6  °l>0 and w2>0 follow from FLY>O and F170>0 respectively. 
7  The  socially  efficient  solution would  of course be  to have  a  single 
firm  (N=l)  and  to choose K0,  K and L such  that f1f2=r  (ignoring the 
distortionary tax rate 0). 
8  if the instantaneous utility function is of the constant elasticity of 
carginal  utility  or  constant  relative  risk  aversion  variety  with 
ccnstant of relative risk aversion l—y, '<l  comprehensive  consuaption 
would be given by 




r  —i  I  c(u)du  (v—t)t_5  r  Lv"-lJ  .L—7  J  5(t)  =  e  ow 
in a steady  state with  constant r, 
>,  = 
y-l  i- 
provided  this expression is positive,  The logarithmic utility function 
considered in most of the paper corresponds to the special case y=O. 
9  Since ceth±(n±)m and in steady state th=0. 
10  When n=0, steady state equilibrium with positive and bounded per capita 
consumption only  exists  if r=5.  Steady state non—human  wealth  a  is 
"hysteric" in this case,  i.e.  it cannot be determined  from the steady 
state conditions alone but  depends on the  initial conditions  and  the —45- 
values of the  exogenous variables during the adjustment process to  the 
steady state.  For reasons of space we do not consider this case here. 
n+sr  is  a  viability  condition  for  this  economy,  ensuring  positi;e 
long—run  consumption  provided  after—tax  disposable  wage  ircon'p  is 
positive. 
11  Alternatively, the government could run down reserves with B-k  const-nt 
but  B  declining.  The  private  sector would  in that  case  reduce  its 
foreign indebtedness 
12  The  distinction  between  ability  to  service  external  debt  and 
willingness  to  service  this  debt  isn't  relevant  here.  7olontaty 
default  or  repudiation risk cceates external  credit rationing  hut  no 
special  role for a  subcategorv of external assets  labelled  "reserves'  - 
13  The  elasticity  of  money  demand  wfh  respect  t  the  nominal  1nter€s 
rate is —(i/(l-))(l—+ip') 
14  It is eassly crtecked that in the long run. 
(r X)  a  (n+X r)r 
where  -,,  the  ratio  of  comprehensive  consumption  to  usn  plus 
non—human' wealth  is  (fron Footnote 8)  given by 
X  Lr+_  y<l 
y—l  1— 
Therefore, 
(r-)  a 
The  change  in the ratio  a/(w—70)  as r changes  is —46— 
d[_±-_}  (r-o)2±b(l-'y)n 
____  = __________ >0 
dr  ([(—y)n÷a-r]r)2 
Also 
q = r(n+X_r)0) 
or 
(&—yr)n  q =  _________ 
so 
d[I  —nf((l-y)n+6-2r)5+ir2j 
w—r0J 
dr  U(l—-y)n+o—r]r}2 
When y=O  (i.e.  in the logarithmic case considered  in the body  of  the 
paper) d(q/(w—r&)/dc  will be positive  if n+o<2r.  This will  hold  if 
the  economy  is  dynamically  efficient  (r>n)  and  if  r>l,  which  is 
necessary for a>0 (if q>O), 
15  If a12 is positive, this will certainly be the case if a220 and a22<0. 
In Section 5 it is shown that if p'=O (i.e..  a21=0) a22<0 is necessary 
for the appropriate kind of saddlepoint stability. 
16  It is even possible  for  the long—run  inflation rate  to rise  (in the 
seigniorage—revenue—efficient  region) in response  to a cut  in public 
sector capital formation when b12  is positive,  i.e.  when  the  long-run 
seigniorage equilibrium schedule shifts to the  left.  This will  occur 
for  sufficiently  large  shifts  to  the  left  of  the  output—absorption —47— 
equilibrium  schedule.  We  do  not  consider  this  case  for  ceac>ns o 
space 
17  Note that am+b+ks±f*P will jump discontinuously it a  poin  it.  cine  i: 
maN/FL,  bEB/PL,  f*PaEF*F/PL  or  s j sap  discontinuously. Since  the  Ia; 
of  one  price nolds,  E/P=l/P*. so  even with  a  freely floating  exchsng' 
rate  f*F sill not  move  discontinuously  when  the  cxcnsrgc rt umps. 
Any  jump  in a  can  be  ceduced  to the  underljing  jumps  in F  nd a  usin, 
the  wealth idnrfiy.  See  Buitec (198')  fc  a  ineur ezrpea. 
18  Note  that  public  sector  capita1  faumatiun  as,  fith  3  exoflnes 
governed  by  the  single  rsbfi  tout  r  fire  genera  we  coul 
represe'  i0  by  a  frs srec  rsctiel  adussaen'  proaso  a 
.r  ia(,tt,c y+nk;  a>O,  Keu. 
19  This  is '-he special case 'f P  in equatIon (flu  uith  '2 
23  When  57<0.  as  shown  in Fmre  3b  the  real  fitereec ra'-c  us; fill 
much  tha'-  elation  ac2 4afi  incrasses, 
zl  In our aouel  the  prodeu 
- 
-:  f nctaon pc'- I  tfl  1  'ar 
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